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I.

INTRODUCTION

T

he issue of how international law can respond to the advent of
autonomous systems and autonomous cyber capabilities is fraught and
emotive, especially in the context of warfare, with images of “killer robots”
on one side and claims that autonomy will further humanitarian ends on the
other.1 This article explores the intersection of autonomous cyber
capabilities and two primary rules of international law—that requiring
respect for the sovereignty of other States and the prohibition on coercive
intervention into their internal or external affairs. Of all of the rules of
international law, these are the likeliest to be violated through employment
of cyber capabilities, whether autonomous or not. This raises the question
of whether a cyber operation that involves autonomous capabilities presents
unique issues with respect to the application of the two rules. Are they up to
the task of governing autonomy in cyberspace?
II.

INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS

To address this question, it is first necessary to understand the concept of
unlawfulness. The legal term for a violation of international law is
“internationally wrongful act.” According to Article 2 of the Articles on State
Responsibility, a reliable restatement of the customary law of State
responsibility prepared by the International Law Commission, “There is an
internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or
omission: (a) Is attributable to the State under international law; and (b)
Constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.”2 Both criteria
must be satisfied for any cyber operation to be unlawful.
1. Compare HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER
ROBOTS 1 (2012), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms1112_ForUplo
ad.pdf (arguing that autonomous capabilities will result in “killer robots”), with Michael N.
Schmitt & Jeffrey C. Thurner, “Out of the Loop”: Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Law of
Armed Conflict, 4 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL 231, 233 (2013) (concluding that
banning autonomous weapons would be premature and that this technology may help
minimize civilian harm).
2. International Law Commission, Report on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, U.N.
Doc. A/56/10, at 43 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMISSION 32, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter Articles on
State Responsibility] (emphasis added). On customary international law, see International
Law Commission, Report on the Work of Its Seventieth Session, U.N. Doc. A/73/10
(2018); see also G.A. Res. 73/203, ¶¶ 1, 7 (Jan. 11, 2019) (noting that the General Assembly
welcomed the International Law Commission’s report, took note of its recommendations,
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As to the first, there are a number of bases for attributing a cyber
operation to a State. The clearest example is when an “organ” of the State,
such as the armed forces, a security service, an intelligence agency, or the
State’s cyber agency, conducted the cyber operation in question.3 Another
example of when a cyber operation is attributable to a State under law is
when an individual or non-State group, such as a hacktivist, terrorist group,
or private cyber security firm, acts on “the instructions of, or under the
direction or control of, that State in carrying out” the operation.4 Of course,
these are just two of the several bases of attribution recognized by the
International Law Commission.5
In the absence of attribution, a cyber operation will generally not violate
international law (although there are limited exceptions, such as violations
of international criminal law by individuals). For instance, operations
mounted by patriotic hackers or cyber criminals who are not acting at the
behest of a State do not qualify as internationally wrongful acts. Even beyond
this key limitation, the attribution rules can prove challenging. To take one
example, the type of relationship between a State and a non-State group that
qualifies as “instructions or direction or control” is somewhat ambiguous
legally, aside from the fact that evidence of that nexus may not be ironclad.
In that regard, claims of attribution to a State often provoke debates over
the requisite standard of evidential sufficiency.
The fact that a cyber operation involves autonomous capabilities can
complicate factual attribution, but it does not make attribution more difficult
as a matter of law. It is the nature of the relationship between the State and
the individual or group conducting the operation that determines whether
the attribution criterion for an internationally wrongful act has been satisfied.
Taking the most straightforward example, a military unit’s cyber operation
that employs an autonomous capability is attributable to the unit’s State
irrespective of the consequences of the operation, including whether the unit
anticipated, or could have reasonably anticipated, those consequences.
Those are instead issues that bear on the second criterion of an
internationally wrongful act, breach of a legal obligation owed another State.
and encouraged the “widest possible dissemination” of the report’s findings on the
identification of customary international law).
3. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 2, art. 4.
4. Id. art. 8.
5. Other attributable cyber operations could include those conducted by persons or
entities exercising elements of governmental authority (id. art. 5), organs placed at the
disposal of a State by another State (id. at art. 6), operations carried out in the absence or
default of the official authorities (id. art. 9), an insurrectional or other movement that
becomes the new government (id. art. 10), and conduct that is acknowledged and adopted
by a State (id. art. 11).
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For the sake of this article’s analysis, it will be assumed that the use of
the autonomous cyber capabilities under consideration is attributable to a
State. Therefore, the remaining analysis will focus on breach of the
international law obligations requiring respect for the sovereignty of other
States and prohibiting coercive intervention.
III.

AUTONOMY

Before proceeding to those two obligations and the question of whether
autonomy presents unique challenges to their application in the cyber
context, it is first necessary to lay the groundwork for analysis by considering
the concept of autonomy. Unfortunately, discussions of autonomous
systems are plagued by a cacophony of definitions. For the purposes of this
article, however, the definitional framework provided by Rain Liivoja,
Maarja Naagel, and Ann Valjataga works well.
[W]e consider autonomous operation in its simplest sense to refer to the
ability of a system to perform some task without requiring real-time
interaction with a human operator. Thus, the way a system performs is not
decided, in each instance, by a person, but is the result of the design and
programming of the system and the stimuli that it receives from its
operational environment.
....
[T]his broad definition of autonomy does not mean that an autonomous
system is by definition one that is completely beyond human control.
Rather, it means that the manner in which a human interacts with the
system and exercises control over it differs from a system that is operated
manually in real time.
....
. . . Thus, when we speak in this paper of an autonomous cyber capability,
we mean a capability that involves the performance of some significant
function with a significant degree of autonomy. What constitutes
significant would, however, vary from capability to capability.6

By this approach, different capabilities have different degrees of
autonomy, ranging from so-called automated to those that are highly
autonomous, with the common feature being the lack of real-time human
6. RAIN LIIVOJA, MAARJA NAAGEL & ANN VALJATAGA, NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER
DEFENCE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE, AUTONOMOUS CYBER CAPABILITIES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 10–11 (2019), https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/07/Autonomy-inCyber-Capabilities-under-International-Law_260619-002.pdf.
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direction.7 Thus, using common terminology, the autonomous systems
referred to in this article include most “on the loop” (human monitoring
and, if necessary, control) and “out of the loop systems” (system operating
without human involvement), but not those in which the human is “in the
loop” (human involved in operation of the system).
In the context of the law surrounding autonomous cyber capabilities, it
also is useful to distinguish cyber operations that are offensive from ones
that are defensive. As discussed in this article, the former category comprises
cyber operations employing autonomous capabilities that are attributable to
a State, whereas the latter are operations that are a direct response to the
ongoing or imminent hostile cyber operations of another State. For instance,
an autonomous capability designed to disable cyber infrastructure that is
being used to carry out a hostile operation falls into the defensive category,
whereas the operation to which it responds is offensive in character. A
borderline case is one in which an autonomous cyber capability is employed
in response to another State’s hostile cyber operation but the responsive
action targets cyber infrastructure other than that used to conduct the hostile
operation. As examined herein, such a response would be encompassed in
the offensive category, even though its motivation was defensive.
Defensive cyber operations employing autonomy may be further divided
into passive and active operations. A passive capability operates within the
targeted system. Examples are most firewalls and intrusion detection or
prevention systems. Active defensive measures, by contrast, operate beyond
the targeted systems, the paradigmatic example being a “hack back.” As will
be apparent, both the offensive-defensive and passive-active distinctions are
relevant when assessing whether the use of an autonomous cyber capability
7. For a survey of this issue, see TIM MCFARLAND, AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS
29–51 (2020). For U.S. specific military terminology
and definitions related to autonomy in weapons systems, see U.S. Department of Defense,
Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapons Systems 13 (2012, Incorporating Change 1, May
8, 2017), https://www.esd.whs.mil/portals/54/documents/dd/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf .
Directive 3000.09 defines autonomous weapon system as:
AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

A weapon system that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further
intervention by a human operator. This includes human-supervised autonomous weapon
systems that are designed to allow human operators to override operation of the weapon
system, but can select and engage targets without further human input after activation.

Id. at 13–14. Further, the Directive defines a human-supervised autonomous weapon
system as “[a]n autonomous weapon system that is designed to provide human
operators with the ability to intervene and terminate engagements, including in the
event of a weapon system failure, before unacceptable levels of damage occur” and a
semi-autonomous weapon system as “[a] weapon system that, once activated, is
intended to only engage individual targets or specific target groups that have been
selected by a human operator.” Id. at 14.
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amounts to an internationally wrongful act in violation of the rules governing
sovereignty and intervention. It is to those rules that this analysis turns.
IV.

SOVEREIGNTY

The existence of a rule of sovereignty in international law was questioned in
a 2018 speech by then-U.K. Attorney General, Jeremy Wright.
Some have sought to argue for the existence of a cyber specific rule of a
“violation of territorial sovereignty” in relation to interference in the
computer networks of another state without its consent.
Sovereignty is of course fundamental to the international rules-based
system. But I am not persuaded that we can currently extrapolate from that
general principle a specific rule or additional prohibition for cyber activity
beyond that of a prohibited intervention. The UK Government’s position
is therefore that there is no such rule as a matter of current international
law.8

Under this approach, cyber operations, whether involving autonomous
capabilities or not, never violate the sovereignty of the State into which they
are conducted.9 For the United Kingdom, therefore, analysis typically begins
with an assessment of whether a hostile cyber operation constitutes unlawful
intervention,10 or even a use of force in violation of U.N. Charter Article 2(4)
and its customary analogue.
No other State has publicly taken the same position, although during the
2020 U.S. Cyber Command conference, the U.S. Department of Defense
General Counsel expressed a degree of sympathy with elements of the

8. Jeremy Wright, U.K. Attorney General, Cyber and International Law in the 21st
Century (May 23, 2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/cyber-and-inter
national-law-in-the-21st-century [hereinafter Wright Address].
9. See, e.g., Gary P. Corn & Robert Taylor, Sovereignty in the Age of Cyber, 111 AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW UNBOUND 207 (2017). But see Michael N. Schmitt &
Liis Vihul, Sovereignty in Cyberspace: Lex Lata Vel Non?, 111 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW UNBOUND 213 (2017) (arguing that actions that reach a threshold
degree of infringement on the territorial integrity of another State, as well as those that
interfere with or usurp inherently governmental functions, necessarily violate the rule of
sovereignty and are internationally wrongful acts).
10. See infra Part V.
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position.11 A number of States, including France,12 the Netherlands,13 Czech
Republic,14 Austria,15 and Switzerland,16 have taken the opposite position. In
its 2020 Allied Joint Doctrine for Cyberspace Operations, NATO States did so as
well, although the United Kingdom issued a reservation on that particular
element of the doctrine.17
That sovereignty is a rule of international law applicable in the cyber
context is the more defensible position, one well-founded in treaty law, State
practice, and opinio juris, as well as the subsidiary sources of international law,
decisions of tribunals, and the work of scholars.18 Sovereignty is the rule of
11. Paul C. Ney, Jr., U.S. Department of Defense General Counsel, DOD General
Counsel Remarks at U.S. Cyber Command Legal Conference (Mar. 2, 2020), https://
www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/2099378/dod-general-counselremarks-at-us-cyber-command-legal-conference/ [hereinafter Ney Address]. For a fuller
discussion, see Michael Schmitt, The Defense Department’s Measured Take on International Law in
Cyberspace, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/69119/thedefense-departments-measured-take-on-international-law-in-cyberspace/.
12. MINISTÈRE DES ARMÉES, DROIT INTERNATIONAL APPLIQUÉ AUX OPÉRATIONS
DANS LE CYBERSPACE [MINISTRY OF THE ARMIES, INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLIED TO
CYBERSPACE] 6–7 (2019) (Fr.) [hereinafter FRANCE, MINISTÈRE DES ARMÉES]. For an
analysis of the document, see Michael Schmitt, France’s Major Statement on International Law
and Cyber: An Assessment, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/
66194/frances-major-statement-on-international-law-and-cyber-an-assessment/.
13. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of the Netherlands, Letter to the
Parliament on the International Legal Order in Cyberspace, Appendix: International Law in
Cyberspace, at 1–2 (2019), https://www.government.nl/ministries/ministry-of-foreignaffairs/documents/parliamentary-documents/2019/09/26/letter-to-the-parliament-onthe-international-legal-order-in-cyberspace [hereinafter Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs]. For an analysis of the letter, see Michael Schmitt, The Netherlands Releases a Tour de
Force on International Law in Cyberspace: Analysis, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 14, 2019),
https://www.justsecurity.org/66562/the-netherlands-releases-a-tour-de-force-on-internat
ional-law-in-cyberspace-analysis/.
14. Open-Ended Working Group on Developments in the Field of Information and
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security: Second Substantive Session
(10–14 February 2020), U.N. WEB TV (Feb. 11, 2020), http://webtv.un.org/search/3rdmeeting-open-ended-working-group-on-developments-in-the-field-of-information-andtelecommunications-in-the-context-of-international-security-second-substantive-session10–14-february-2020/6131646836001/.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. NATO, ALLIED JOINT PUBLICATION-3.20, ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR
CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS 20 (ed. A, v.1 2020). For an analysis of the publication’s legal
significance, see Michael N. Schmitt, Noteworthy Releases of International Cyber Law Positions –
Part I: NATO, ARTICLES OF WAR (Aug. 27, 2020), https://lieber.westpoint.edu/natorelease-international-cyber-law-positions-part-i/.
18. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, Respect for Sovereignty in Cyberspace, 95 TEXAS
LAW REVIEW 1638 (2017).
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international law most likely to be violated by hostile cyber operations
attributable to States. The aspect of autonomy changes nothing in this
regard.
Sovereignty can be violated based on either territoriality or on
interference or usurpation of inherently governmental functions. For there
to be a territorial violation, a cyber operation attributable to a State must
cause some effect on another State’s territory; it makes no difference
whether that effect manifests on government or private cyberinfrastructure.
More to the point, it makes no legal difference whether the requisite effect
is caused by a system with autonomous capabilities. It is the nature of the
effect that matters.19
The unresolved issue is the type of effects that qualify an operation as a
sovereignty violation. It seems clear that non-de minimis physical damage or
injury caused in another State’s territory by the use of an autonomous cyber
capability would do so. Below the threshold of physical damage or injury,
however, consensus is elusive. The prevailing view appears to be that at least
a cyber operation resulting in a permanent loss of functionality of the
targeted cyber infrastructure, or systems that rely upon it, qualifies.20
Similarly, an operation necessitating either replacement or physical repair of
that system, as in the case of replacing components, violates sovereignty.21
Unfortunately, States have been reticent to set forth their legal positions
as to the threshold for a cyber violation of sovereignty. To date, only France
has done so with any degree of granularity. In a document issued by its
Ministry of the Armies, that State took the position that “Any cyberattack
against French digital systems or any effects produced on French territory
by digital means by a State organ, a person or an entity exercising elements
of governmental authority or by a person or persons acting on the
instructions of or under the direction or control of a State constitutes a
breach of sovereignty.”22 Although the precise parameters of France’s
approach remain to be determined, it is an extremely broad approach to
qualifying cyber operations as violations of sovereignty, one that other States
may feel uncomfortable adopting, lest it bar their own cyber operations.

19. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER
OPERATIONS, r. 4, at 17, and accompanying commentary, at 17–27 (Michael N. Schmitt ed.
2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0].
20. Id. at 20–21; see also FRANCE, MINISTÈRE DES ARMÉES, supra note 12, at 7.
21. For instance, a 2012 hostile cyber operation targeting Saudi Aramco affected 35,000
computers, necessitating the replacement of affected hard drives. See Jose Pagliery, The Inside
Story of the Biggest Hack in History, CNN BUSINESS (Aug. 5, 2015), https://money.cnn.com/
2015/08/05/technology/aramco-hack/.
22. FRANCE, MINISTÈRE DES ARMÉES, supra note 12, at 7.
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Returning to the operational typology, a passive cyber defensive measure
employing autonomous capability will not violate the sovereignty of other
States since it takes place on the territory of the State conducting it.
However, both active defensive measures and offensive cyber operations
involving autonomy raise the prospect of a sovereignty violation. Whether
sovereignty is violated is a question of law (the threshold for violation) and
one of fact (the scale and nature of the effects). Autonomy does not alter the
application of either of these determinations.
Sovereignty can also be violated when a cyber operation by one State
interferes with, or usurps, an inherently governmental function of another
State. Whether this violation can take place outside the territory of the State
against which the hostile cyber operation is directed remains unsettled in
international law.23 For instance, it is unclear whether a cyber operation that
leverages autonomous capabilities to target the Estonian government data
stored at a data center in Luxembourg, thereby impeding Estonian’s ability
to carry out its inherently governmental functions, violates Estonian
sovereignty on this basis.
In most cases, hostile operations are directed against cyberinfrastructure
located in a State’s territory. There is a key distinction between violations
based on interference with or usurpation of an inherently governmental
function and those based on territorial effects. The former, unlike the latter,
does not require any type of harm. The determinative factor is simply
whether interference or usurpation occurred. This distinction opens the
door to non-destructive and non-injurious cyber operations employing
autonomous capabilities, or those that otherwise do not reach the threshold
of territorial violation, amounting to a sovereignty violation.
An inherently governmental function may best be understood as a
function that States alone have the authority to perform (or authorize other
entities to perform on their behalf). Classic examples include collecting taxes,
conducting elections, and enforcing laws. For instance, take the case of an
autonomous cyber capability that searches for systems being used by a
particular candidate’s campaign and disrupts their use. Irrespective of
whether the effects on those systems qualify the operation as a breach on
the basis of territoriality, the fact that the candidate’s campaign has been
disrupted would amount to interference in the conduct of the election by the
State concerned.
Similarly, consider an autonomous cyber capability used by law
enforcement that activates when it senses criminal activity. Such a cyber
capability might then attempt to penetrate the criminal infrastructure to
disable it or gather evidence against the perpetrator. Deploying such law
23. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 19, at 23.
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enforcement cyber capabilities into another State’s criminal jurisdiction
without consent would constitute a violation of the territorial State’s
sovereignty and would usurp an inherently governmental function. This is
because only the State from which the purported criminal activity emanated
enjoys the competency under international law to exercise, or consent to
another State’s exercise of, law enforcement authority on its territory. That
the intrusion relied on autonomous capabilities has no bearing on the
lawfulness of the law enforcement activity.
As with territoriality, the use of an autonomous passive defense
capability is unlikely to trigger a violation of another State’s sovereignty on
the basis of interference with or usurpation of another State’s inherently
governmental functions because States seldom have a right under
international law to engage in those functions abroad (except in the
commons). And as with a violation of sovereignty on the basis of
territoriality, active cyber defense capabilities and offensive operations, even
if being employed autonomously, risk violating the law should they interfere
with or usurp another State’s exclusive right to engage such functions on its
own territory.
V.

INTERVENTION

Unlike sovereignty, the existence of a rule of non-intervention in the cyber
context is uncontroversial, as illustrated by the U.N. Group of
Governmental Experts’ confirmation in its 2015 report,24 a position
subsequently endorsed by the General Assembly.25 Intervention into the
internal or external affairs of another State is an internationally wrongful act
in both customary international law and under certain treaties, such as the
Charter of the Organization of American States.26 The parameters of a treaty
violation of the rule are to be found in the text of the instruments
themselves, as well as through interpretation consistent with precepts in the

24. Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (2015),
transmitted by Letter Dated 26 June 2015 from the Chair of the Group of Governmental
Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the
Context of International Security Established Pursuant to Resolution 68/243 (2014) ¶¶ 26,
27(b), U.N. Doc. A/70/174 (July 22, 2015).
25. G.A. Res. 70/237, at 2 (Dec. 30, 2015).
26. Charter of the Organization of American States, art. 15, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T.
2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3.
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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,27 while the following analysis of
intervention by autonomous cyber means is limited to the customary
international law rule of non-intervention.28
In its Nicaragua judgment, the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
applying customary international law, observed that intervention consists of
two elements, both of which must be satisfied for a violation to occur. First,
the object of the cyber operation must be another State’s internal or external
affairs, known as the domaine réservé. As, the Court explained,
[T]he principle forbids all States or groups of States to intervene directly
or indirectly in internal or external affairs of other States. A prohibited
intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters in which each
State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely.
One of these is the choice of a political, economic, social and cultural
system, and the formulation of foreign policy.29

In other words, domaine réservé is an area of activity that international law
leaves for States to regulate, thereby recognizing their discretion to make
their own choices about such activities. Although the precise contours of the
domaine réservé are indistinct, certain activities unambiguously fall within its
ambit. For example, language policy, elections, crisis management, the
structure of government, and diplomatic activities clearly qualify, thereby
opening the door to the possibility that using autonomous cyber capabilities
to affect them, as in the case of disrupting the functioning of a nation’s
response to a pandemic,30 might run afoul of the non-intervention rule. By
contrast, matters committed to international law, such as the international
human rights to expression and privacy online, do not qualify. For instance,
using autonomous cyber capabilities to disrupt another State’s efforts to
block lawful online expression would not qualify as a violation of the nonintervention rule; it might, however, violate the sovereignty of the State
concerned.
27. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 31–33, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
28. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 19, r. 66, at 312, and accompanying
commentary, at 312–25.
29. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgement, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 205 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua].
30. See, e.g., Marko Milanovic & Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber Attacks and Cyber
(Mis)information Operations During a Pandemic, JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND
POLICY (forthcoming 2020) (discussing sovereignty and intervention in the context of a
global pandemic).
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Although there is significant overlap with the concept of inherently
governmental functions in the law of sovereignty, domaine réservé is a broader
notion.31 Most inherently governmental functions qualify as a domaine réservé,
but certain domaine réservés are not inherently governmental. An example is
the provision of tertiary education, which in many States is provided by the
private sector and thus not inherently governmental. However, it is a domaine
réservé since international law generally leaves States free to regulate such
education. Accordingly, an offensive cyber operation involving autonomous
capabilities that disrupts the functioning of tertiary education would likely
not violate sovereignty unless it caused the requisite territorial effects but
could constitute prohibited intervention so long as the second element of
intervention, coercion, is satisfied.32
The ICJ discussed coercion in its Nicaragua judgment, stating:
Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard to
such choices, which must remain free ones. The element of coercion,
which defines, and indeed forms the very essence of, prohibited
intervention, is particularly obvious in the case of an intervention which
uses force, either in the direct form of military action, or in the indirect
form of support for subversive or terrorist armed activities within another
State.33

Applying this standard by analogy, using an offensive autonomous cyber
capability to support insurgents fighting their government would amount to
a clear case of intervention. The question, though, is in what other
circumstances is use of an autonomous cyber capability against a domaine
réservé prohibited by the rule?
In a 2019 letter to the Parliament on the “International Legal Order
in Cyberspace,” the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted the
imprecise definition of coercion, before characterizing the concept of
coercion as follows:

31. On the relationship between sovereignty and the non-intervention principle, see
HARRIET MOYNIHAN, CHATHAM HOUSE, THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO
STATE CYBERATTACKS: SOVEREIGNTY AND NON-INTERVENTION 48–51 (2019), https://
www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2019-11-29-Intl-LawCyberattacks.pdf.
32. However, the analysis must be precise. If universities are engaged in developing
responses to a pandemic at the behest of or in cooperation with the government, use of an
autonomous cyber capability could be a violation of sovereignty on the basis that dealing
with a pandemic is an inherently governmental function.
33. Nicaragua, supra note 29, ¶ 205.
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The precise definition of coercion, and thus of unauthorised intervention,
has not yet fully crystallised in international law. In essence it means
compelling a state to take a course of action (whether an act or an omission)
that it would not otherwise voluntarily pursue. The goal of the intervention
must be to effect change in the behaviour of the target state.34

Restated, an act of coercion is one that deprives another State of choice by
either causing that State to behave in a way it otherwise would not or to
refrain from acting in a manner in which it otherwise would act.35 Merely
influencing the other State’s choice does not suffice; the choice to act or not
has to effectively be taken off the table in the sense that a reasonable State
in the same or similar circumstances would no longer consider it to be a
viable option.
To illustrate, using autonomous cyber capabilities to spread
disinformation during an election is a noxious form of influence, but it is not
necessarily coercive, for voters (the State) retain their ability to decide for
whom to vote. But using autonomous cyber capabilities to disrupt the
operation of voting machinery or alter vote counts would certainly be
coercive because the very ability of members of the electorate to exercise
political choice has been denied.36
An often-misunderstood dynamic of the prohibition involves the
relationship between the coercion and the domaine réservé. The domaine réservé
is not the physical target of the operation. Rather, it is that area of activity
that the cyber operation is meant to coerce. Consider a State’s covert cyber
operation that employs autonomous capabilities in a ransomware attack
against the sole international port facility of another State. To assess whether
34. Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 13, at 3; Wright Address, supra
note 8. In his speech, Attorney General Wright observed, “The precise boundaries of this
principle are the subject of ongoing debate between states, and not just in the context of
cyber space.” Id.; see also Brian J. Egan, International Law and Stability in Cyberspace, 35
BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 169, 174–75 (2017) (noting the challenges
of applying the rule of non-intervention, and sovereignty more generally, to cyberspace
while serving as U.S. Department of State Legal Adviser).
35. See DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, AUSTRALIA’S
INTERNATIONAL CYBER ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY: 2019 INTERNATIONAL LAW
SUPPLEMENT (2019), https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/international-relations/inter
national-cyber-engagement-strategy/aices/chapters/2019_international_law_supplement.
html (defining a prohibited intervention as “one that interferes by coercive means (in the
sense that they effectively deprive another state of the ability to control, decide, or govern
matters of an inherently sovereign nature), either directly or indirectly, in matters that a state
is permitted by the principle of state sovereignty to decide freely”).
36. See Michael N. Schmitt, “Virtual” Disenfranchisement: Cyber Election Meddling in the Grey
Zones of International Law, 19 CHICAGO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 30 (2018)
(discussing cyber election meddling that would be considered coercive).
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the operation constitutes unlawful intervention, it is necessary to determine
why the former is conducting that hostile activity. If it is merely a criminal
attempt to acquire funds, it is not coercive vis-a-vis any domaine réservé.
However, if designed to force the State to, for instance, alter its trade practice
by creating a situation in which there is no choice but to transship through
the attacker’s logistics network, the relationship between the coercive
operation and a domaine réservé exists.
As to the typology of operations, passive defensive cyber operations
enabled by autonomy will not violate this rule because there is no domaine
réservé to coerce; States do not enjoy control over a domaine réservé on the
territory of other States. In most cases, the same is true with regard to active
defensive cyber operations that employ autonomous capabilities. This is
because there must be an attempt to deprive the State concerned of its
exercise of choice over an area of activity that is not committed to
international law. Since the State conducting the initial hostile cyber
operation to which the defensive action responds is operating
extraterritorially, that operation is committed to international law rules
ranging from the requirement to respect the sovereignty of other States to
the prohibition on the use of force. It may be that the specific operation
does not violate any particular rule, but that extraterritorial cyber operations
into another State’s territory are governed by the general rules of
international law, a position long accepted by the international community.37
Of course, offensive cyber operations are subject to the rule of nonintervention, whether conducted using autonomous capabilities or not.
Beyond attribution, the only question is whether the elements necessary for
breach of that primary rule have been satisfied.
VI.

INTENT AND MISTAKE OF FACT

The fact that autonomous cyber capabilities operate without human
involvement, and sometimes without immediate human oversight, raises
issues of intent and mistake of fact. In this regard, it is necessary to dispense
with one red herring at the outset. Just because a cyber capability operates
autonomously does not mean that the State that employs it lacks the intent
to cause the requisite consequences. Autonomous systems are not
independent actors in the legal system. Rather, autonomous capabilities are
37. See, e.g., Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the
Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security
(2013), transmitted by Letter Dated 7 June 2013 from the Chair of the Group of
Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security Established Pursuant to
Resolution 66/24 (2012), ¶¶ 19–20, U.N. Doc. A/68/98 (June 24, 2013).
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programmed by humans and, more importantly, humans decide to use them.
So long as that decision is attributable to a State as described above, the use
of an autonomous cyber capability in no way takes the operation beyond the
reach of the rules regarding sovereignty and intervention.
However, that a human may not entirely understand how a system with
autonomous capabilities might operate, or at least be able to predict the
consequences of its use, raises an interesting question. If the individual or
entity deciding to use the capability did not intend the effect that occurred,
but that effect would otherwise qualify the operation as a violation of either
the sovereignty or intervention rules, have those rules nevertheless been
violated?
Consider a cyber operation that uses autonomous capabilities to map a
targeted system in another country. The State conducting the operation
harbors no intention of causing any physical effects that would violate
sovereignty, and mere cyber espionage is generally not considered to be an
internationally wrongful act.38 However, during the course of the operation,
some damage unexpectedly results to the targeted system. Has the State
conducting the operation breached its obligation to respect the target State’s
sovereignty?
Or consider a State’s covert cyber operation employing autonomous
capabilities to engage in the theft of intellectual property related to the
development of a vaccine vital to combating an ongoing pandemic. The State
does not seek to impede the process, but after discovering the breach the
affected laboratories have to shut down temporarily to assess the integrity of
research data. As a result, development of the critical vaccine is slowed. Did
the operation violate the rule of nonintervention because (1) a nation’s
pandemic response falls within its domaine réservé and (2) the laboratories were
forced to temporarily interrupt vaccine development? Of course, such
situations could arise in the case of a cyber operation not employing
autonomous capabilities, but they would seem more likely to surface should
autonomy be relied upon.
The International Law Commission addressed the issues of intent and
knowledge in its commentary to the Articles on State Responsibility.
Whether there has been a breach of a rule may depend on the intention or
knowledge of relevant State organs or agents and in that sense may be
38. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 19, r. 32, at 168; see also Ashley Deeks, An
International Legal Framework for Surveillance, 55 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
291, 300–13 (2015). But see Inaki Navarrete & Russell Buchan, Out of the Legal Wilderness:
Peacetime Espionage, International Law and the Existence of Customary Exceptions, 51 CORNELL
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 897 (2019); RUSSELL BUCHAN, CYBER ESPIONAGE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2018).
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“subjective”. For example, article II of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide states that: “In the present
Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such …” In other cases, the standard for breach of an obligation
may be “objective”, in the sense that the advertence or otherwise of
relevant State organs or agents may be irrelevant. Whether responsibility is
“objective” or “subjective” in this sense depends on the circumstances,
including the content of the primary obligation in question. The articles lay
down no general rule in that regard. The same is true of other standards,
whether they involve some degree of fault, culpability, negligence or want
of due diligence. Such standards vary from one context to another for
reasons which essentially relate to the object and purpose of the treaty
provision or other rule giving rise to the primary obligation. Nor do the
articles lay down any presumption in this regard as between the different
possible standards. Establishing these is a matter for the interpretation and
application of the primary rules engaged in the given case.39

In other words, the role of intent turns on whether it is an element of
the breach in question. On the one hand, if it is, as is textually the case with
genocide and other rules of international criminal law, the absence of intent
will preclude a cyber operation that involves autonomous cyber capabilities
from amounting to either an internationally wrongful act by the State
concerned or an act generating individual criminal responsibility.
Importantly though, the commentary acknowledges that intent can be a
condition precedent to the breach of a primary rule in which the requirement
is not clear on its face. Thus, in cases of an implicit intent requirement, no
breach will lie absent intent.
On the other hand, the absence of an express or implied intent
requirement raises the possibility of breach even if the consequences that
manifested were unforeseen and unforeseeable. Accordingly, the role of
intent in assessing whether a cyber operation employing autonomous
capabilities violates international law depends on the presence or absence of
a mens rea element in the individual primary rules.
However, a degree of caution is merited. As Marko Milanovic has noted,
certain rules and regimes of international law have developed bespoke
standards with respect to mistakes of fact. For instance, he notes that in
international human rights law and international humanitarian law an
“honest and reasonable” mistake as to the facts can exonerate the State

39. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 2, art. 2, commentary ¶ 3, at 34–35.
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concerned.40 This begs the question of whether a similar mistake of fact
standard should apply in the case of other rules of international law like
sovereignty and intervention.
To illustrate, consider a State A cyber countermeasure41 involving
autonomous capabilities mounted against State B that bleeds over into State
C. The result is a permanent loss of functionality of affected cyber
infrastructure in State C, a violation of that State’s sovereignty. If State A
should have known (constructive knowledge) that bleed over would occur,
it has violated State C’s sovereignty even though the operation’s qualification
as a countermeasure precluded its wrongfulness as to State B. The belief that
there would be no bleed over was not reasonable. But if the belief was
reasonable, should that fact excuse the violation of State C’s sovereignty?
The experts who drafted Tallinn Manual 2.0 concluded that a reasonable
mistake of fact as to the need to use force in self-defense against another
State would excuse that use of force.42 As Milanovic notes, there is a degree
of State practice supporting this position.43 Yet the ICJ seemed to come to a
contrary conclusion in its Oil Platforms judgment.44 And in the context of
countermeasures, the International Law Commission, in its commentary to
the Articles on State Responsibility, opined that,
A State taking countermeasures acts at its peril, if its view of the question
of wrongfulness turns out not to be well founded. A State which resorts to
countermeasures based on its unilateral assessment of the situation does so
at its own risk and may incur responsibility for its own wrongful conduct
in the event of an incorrect assessment. In this respect, there is no
difference between countermeasures and other circumstances precluding
wrongfulness.45

A majority of the experts who authored Tallinn Manual 2.0 took the same
position. In doing so, they “emphasised the desirability of preventing a
proliferation of countermeasures and the fact that countermeasures, despite
being designed to resume lawful relations between the States concerned,
40. Marko Milanovic, Mistakes of Fact When Using Lethal Force in International Law: Part I,
EJIL:TALK! (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.ejiltalk.org/mistakes-of-fact-when-using-lethalforce-in-international-law-part-i/.
41. See infra Section VII.A.
42. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 19, at 347.
43. Marko Milanovic, Mistakes of Fact When Using Lethal Force in International Law: Part II,
EJIL:TALK! (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.ejiltalk.org/mistakes-of-fact-when-using-lethalforce-in-international-law-part-ii/.
44. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 161, ¶ 73 (Nov. 6).
45. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 2, commentary to art. 49, at 130–31.
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nevertheless present a risk of escalation.”46 The experts distinguished this
position from their view with respect to a mistake of fact in the context of
self-defense on the basis that States should be afforded a wide degree of
discretion to act when the consequences of a failure to do so can be
extremely serious, as is the case with respect to a failure to respond to an
armed attack.
But that conclusion was not unanimous. Some experts contended that
an honest and reasonable mistake of fact should operate to leave the
countermeasure’s preclusion of wrongfulness intact.47 In their view, States
must be empowered to defend themselves against hostile cyber operations,
whether those operations are at the level of an armed attack entitling the
victim State to act in self-defense or an internationally wrongful act below
that level that opens the door to countermeasures.
As is apparent, the law surrounding the mistake of fact doctrine, beyond
discreet bodies of law in which such a doctrine clearly applies, remains
unsettled. This is certainly the case with respect to both sovereignty and
intervention. The sounder legal position is that it does not excuse a violation
of international law unless it negates intent with regard to a primary rule of
international law requiring intent as a condition of violation. Otherwise, the
State that was the victim of the mistake of fact would have to suffer the
consequences of that mistake without the possibility of securing reparations,
which are only due in the face of an internationally wrongful act.48 By
rejecting the applicability of a mistake of fact doctrine, the costs of a mistake
of fact are appropriately shouldered by a State making it, not the victim of
that mistake.
Since intent is not a required element of the breach of the obligation to
respect the sovereignty of another State, a cyber operation using
autonomous capability that causes unintended qualifying effects would
violate international law. As to the unsettled question of whether a mistake
of fact doctrine might excuse a sovereignty violation, States are likely to
reject its applicability for the aforementioned reason, particularly as
autonomous, and especially artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities become
common. After all, the less control a State exercises over the conduct of an
operation, the more logical it is that the State bears the risk of its mistake
and the less appropriate it is that victim States should be left less than whole.
By contrast, intent is an implied requirement for the internationally
wrongful act of intervention into the internal or external affairs of another
State. Recall that there must be a relationship between coercion and the
46. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 19, at 116.
47. Id.
48. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 2, art. 31.
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domaine réservé; the State conducting the operation has to seek to deprive the
target State of choice with respect to its behavior or policies involving a
domaine réservé. Therefore, absent intent to do so, there would be no violation
of this prohibition if an autonomous cyber capability caused unexpected
harm that in fact deprived the affected State of choice.
To take a simple example, consider a case in which a State uses
autonomous passive cyber defences to enhance the security of cyber systems
on its territory. An insurgent group in another State has been using a social
media platform operated from the former for command, control, and
communications (C3) in hostilities with the government. The autonomous
passive defensive measures significantly improve the security of social media,
thereby contributing to the security of the insurgent group’s C3. In that there
was no intent to enhance the insurgent group’s operational capabilities, there
is no intervention.
VII.

CIRCUMSTANCES PRECLUDING WRONGFULNESS

Even though certain cyber operations employing autonomous capabilities
might breach either the obligation to respect the sovereignty of other States
or the prohibition on intervention into the internal or external affairs of
those States, international law sets forth a number of circumstances in which
international law nevertheless would not be violated. These so-called
“circumstances precluding wrongfulness” include consent, self-defense,
qualification of the action as a countermeasure, force majeure, distress, and
necessity.49 The most significant in the context of autonomy are
countermeasures, necessity, and self-defense; the analysis that follows
focuses on these three circumstances.
A. Countermeasures
A countermeasure is an “act” (either an action or an omission) that would
be unlawful but for the fact that it is designed to put an end to another State’s
(the “responsible State”) operation that is breaching an obligation owed the
former (the “injured State”).50 Nothing bars application of this circumstance
precluding wrongfulness to cyber operations that involve autonomous
capabilities.

49. Id. arts. 20–25.
50. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 19, rr. 20–25, at 111–34; see also Michael N.
Schmitt, “Below the Threshold” Cyber Operations: The Countermeasures Response Option and
International Law, 54 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 697 (2014).
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As an example, this basis for precluding wrongfulness of an act could
allow for active defense, such as an autonomously conducted hack-back or
a human launched hack-back involving autonomous capabilities. It could
also take the form of an offensive operation employing autonomous
capabilities against systems other than those used to conduct the unlawful
cyber operation if the objective is to compel the responsible State to desist.
This is because a countermeasure need not be directed at the entity
conducting the unlawful cyber operation or the cyberinfrastructure from
which it originated. For instance, a cyber countermeasure might leverage
autonomous capabilities to target vulnerable government or private
cyberinfrastructure having nothing to do with the cyber operation to which
the injured State is responding. A countermeasure need not even be in-kind;
a cyber operation involving autonomous capability may be used in response
to a non-cyber internationally wrongful act, as in the case of providing
funding or arms to an insurgent group fighting the government.51 The key
limitation on countermeasures is instead that they may only be intended to
either put an end to an ongoing unlawful action or to secure reparations for
one that has been completed, or both; countermeasures may not, however,
be motivated by a desire to punish or retaliate.52
The prospect of employing an autonomous capability as a
countermeasure raises three issues. First, countermeasures must be
proportionate. Proportionality is understood in the countermeasures context
as meaning “commensurate with the injury suffered, taking into account the
gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in question.”53 In
practical terms, the negative effects of the countermeasure for the
responsible State may not be excessive relative to the harm the injured State
is suffering. If the autonomous capability causes excessive harm, the State
taking the purported countermeasure will have itself violated international
law. In this regard, recall that the absence of intent or a mistake of fact often
will not excuse the injured State’s violation even if the nature and extent of
harm caused were unforeseen and unforeseeable. In most cases, a
disproportionate countermeasure will violate the responsible State’s
sovereignty, but other violations might also occur.
Second, the Articles on State Responsibility provide that “[b]efore taking
countermeasures, an injured State shall call upon the responsible State . . . to
fulfil its obligations [to cease the operation and offer any appropriate

51. Such actions qualify as intervention. See e.g., Nicaragua, supra note 29, ¶ 242.
52. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 2, art. 49(1).
53. Id. art. 51.

568

Sovereignty, Intervention, and Autonomous Cyber Capabilities

Vol. 96

assurances, guarantees and reparations.54 Further, the injured State must
“notify the responsible State of any decision to take countermeasures and
offer to negotiate with that State.”55 An absolute notification requirement
would not necessarily preclude the post-notice launch of a cyber
countermeasure involving autonomous capabilities, but it would bar using
autonomous capabilities to launch an automatic response to an incoming
hostile cyber operation.
The commentary to the Articles on State Responsibility acknowledges
that there may be certain situations requiring “urgent countermeasures” to
preserve an injured State’s rights.56 States that have spoken to the issue have
taken a strong stance against a notice requirement in situations in which
notice might diminish the countermeasure’s likelihood of success, for
instance by allowing the responsible State to take measures in anticipation
of the action57 or because providing notice could reveal sensitive
capabilities.58 This does not necessarily mean that an automatic hack-back
relying upon autonomous capabilities or a no-notice countermeasure
involving autonomy would never run afoul of the purported notice
requirement. But it does open the door to no-notice countermeasures so
long as the State employing the autonomous capability can make a cogent
argument that it was necessary to act without notice, as might be the case
with hostile operations against critical infrastructure that can only be
defeated by exploiting a zero day vulnerability in the responsible State’s
systems.
Third, countermeasures are only available in response to internationally
wrongful acts that are attributable to States.59 Therefore, to be lawful there
would have to be a relatively high degree of certainty that a particular State
was behind the hostile cyber operation if autonomous capabilities were used
to determine whether to launch the countermeasure response or the
countermeasure response itself involved autonomous capabilities. This is an
important limitation in light of the view expressed above that a mistake of
54. Id. arts. 30–31.
55. Id. art. 52.
56. Id. art. 52, commentary ¶ 1, at 135.
57. FRANCE, MINISTÈRE DES ARMÉES, supra note 12, at 8; Netherlands, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, supra note 13, at 7; Ney Address, supra note 11.
58. Wright Address, supra note 8.
59. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 2, art. 22. Note that a countermeasure
directed at a non-State actor conducting hostile cyber operations might be appropriate if
the State from which the operation being mounted is in breach of its due diligence
obligation. See Michael N. Schmitt, In Defense of Due Diligence, 124 YALE LAW JOURNAL
FORUM 68, 79–80 (2015), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/in-defense-of-due-dili
gence-in-cyberspace.
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fact does not excuse an internationally wrongful act unless provided for in
the body of law or primary rule in question, which is not the case with
sovereignty or intervention. Indeed, recall that both the International Law
Commission and a majority of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts were of the
view that countermeasures are taken at the injured State’s risk.60
B. Necessity
A second basis upon which the wrongfulness of a cyber operation utilizing
autonomous capability is precluded is in a circumstance of necessity. As
noted in the Articles on State Responsibility, a cyber operation is “necessary”
when it is “the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against
a grave and imminent peril” and the act “does not seriously impair an
essential interest of the State or States towards which the obligation exists,
or of the international community as a whole.”61
This circumstance precluding wrongfulness is especially important, for
there is no requirement that the hostile cyber operation to which the cyber
operation responds be attributable to a State, or even that the initiator of the
operation be known. Moreover, the hostile cyber operation to which the
State responds in necessity need not be an internationally wrongful act. Most
importantly, a State’s cyber operation conducted on the basis of necessity is
lawful even though it may breach an obligation such as sovereignty that is
owed another State that bears no responsibility whatsoever for the situation,
as long as doing so does not seriously affect the latter’s essential interests.
This makes the possibility of bleed over caused by an autonomous capability
less likely to result in a violation of international law. Thus, necessity fills key
gaps left by these requirements in the context of countermeasures.62
As with countermeasures, there may be practical issues with respect to
using autonomous capabilities in situations of necessity, both when they
contribute to determining whether to launch a response (perhaps without
human involvement), and as to those that form part of the cyber response.
With respect to the former, the autonomous capability would have to discern
if an essential interest of the State is at stake and determine whether the
negative impact on that interest is grave. Part of the challenge is that neither
“essential interest” nor “grave and imminent peril” are well-defined in
international law.

60. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
61. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 2, art. 25(1); see generally TALLINN
MANUAL 2.0, supra note 19, r. 26, at 135, and accompanying commentary, at 135–42.
62. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 2, commentary to art. 25.
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In this regard, policymakers and scholars often speak in terms of hostile
cyber operations against critical infrastructure as triggering necessity.
However, it is not the infrastructure that must be essential, but rather the
interest that an operation against the infrastructure will affect that must
qualify as essential. Moreover, the notion of critical infrastructure is relative;
one State’s critical infrastructure may not be another’s because State’s have
differing needs. And even if it can be agreed that certain cyber infrastructure
is of a nature that an operation conducted against it will always affect an
essential interest, as in the case of nuclear facilities, a cyber operation
targeting that infrastructure might not gravely affect the interest. Thus, while
there could be circumstances in which the employment of autonomous
capabilities on the basis of necessity is lawful, the capability would have to
be programmed very carefully to ensure it comports with necessity’s
demanding criteria.
Finally, the requirement that a cyber operation mounted on the basis of
necessity not place the essential interests of other States in grave and
imminent peril presents a significant obstacle if autonomous capabilities are
used. Should the response cause an effect at that level, the fact that the State
did not anticipate those consequences, a possibility that is likely exacerbated
by autonomous capabilities, would not shield it from responsibility for
violations of international law, in particular sovereignty, involving those
effects.
C. Self-Defense
A third circumstance precluding wrongfulness is self-defense pursuant to
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and customary international law.63 That article
provides, in relevant part, “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”64
Although self-defense as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness is usually
discussed in the context of the prohibition on the use of force found in
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and customary international law, most uses
of force also violate the sovereignty of the State into which they are
conducted and, as noted by the ICJ in its Nicaragua judgment, the rule of

63. Id. art. 21; see generally TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 19, rr. 71–75 and
accompanying commentary, at 339–56.
64. U.N. Charter art. 51.
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non-intervention.65 Thus, if a cyber operation involving autonomous
capability qualifies as an act of self-defense, neither of those rules is violated.
In that preclusion of wrongfulness under self-defense envisions a use of
force, strict criteria govern its applicability. Most important, self-defense is
only available when the operation to which it responds is at the level of an
“armed attack.”66 That threshold is somewhat ambiguous in the non-cyber
context but much more so with respect to hostile cyber operations.67 Cyber
operations involving autonomous capabilities that result in significant
human injury or physical damage clearly qualify, but below that kinetic
threshold there is a lack of international consensus.68
The most robust position taken to date is that of the French Ministry of
the Armies, which announced in 2019 that:
[a] cyberattack could be categorised as an armed attack if it caused
substantial loss of life or considerable physical or economic damage. That
would be the case of an operation in cyberspace that caused a failure of
critical infrastructure with significant consequences or consequences liable
to paralyse whole swathes of the country’s activity, trigger technological or
ecological disasters and claim numerous victims.69

65. Nicaragua, supra note 29, ¶ 205.
66. See U.N. Charter art. 51.
67. Michael N. Schmitt, The Use of Cyber Force and International Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1110, 1119–29 (Marc Weller
ed. 2015).
68. See Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 13, at 9 (“At present there
is no international consensus on qualifying a cyberattack as an armed attack if it does not
cause fatalities, physical damage or destruction yet nevertheless has very serious nonmaterial consequences.”). However, there is a growing sense that the assessment should be
contextual, as recommended by the Tallinn Manual Experts. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra
note 19, at 333–37; see also Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 13, at 4
It is necessary, when assessing the scale and effects of a cyber operation, to examine both
qualitative and quantitative factors. The Tallinn Manual 2.0 refers to a number of factors
that could play a role in this regard, including how serious and far-reaching the cyber
operation’s consequences are, whether the operation is military in nature and whether it is
carried out by a state.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, AUSTRALIA’S INTERNATIONAL CYBER
ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY: ANNEX A: AUSTRALIA’S POSITION ON HOW INTERNATIONAL
LAW APPLIES TO STATE CONDUCT IN CYBERSPACE (2017), https://www.dfat.gov.au/
publications/international-relations/international-cyber-engagement-strategy/aices/chap
ters/annexes.html (“In determining whether a cyber attack, or any other cyber activity,
constitutes a use of force, states should consider whether the activity’s scale and effects are
comparable to traditional kinetic operations that rise to the level of use of force under
international law.”).
69. FRANCE, MINISTÈRE DES ARMÉES, supra note 12, at 8.
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Since the French position has not yet been publicly embraced by other
States, most of whom have remained silent on the matter, the threshold at
which self-defense will preclude the wrongfulness of a cyber operation
involving autonomous capabilities remains uncertain.
This being so, States resorting to autonomous capabilities must be alert
lest they inadvertently respond in self-defense to a cyber operation that falls
short of the armed attack threshold, wherever it might lie. This prospect is
particularly problematic because while it is uncertain whether a mistake of
fact excuses a mistaken use of cyber force in self-defense, there is no
question that it does not excuse a mistake of the law, such as an error
regarding the threshold for breach. And even though the threshold of harm
necessary to trigger the right of self-defense is ambiguous, a State operating
in the grey zone of normative uncertainty always risks the condemnation of
other States. That autonomous capabilities might generate results that are
somewhat less predictable than cyber operations not employing such
capabilities only increases this risk.
Two additional uncertainties in the law of self-defense further
complicate cyber operations involving autonomous capabilities. First, there
is a longstanding debate as to whether States are entitled to resort to selfdefense in the face of hostile operations at the armed attack level that were
neither mounted by another State nor, in the words of the ICJ in the
Nicaragua judgment, conducted “by or on behalf,” or with the “substantial
involvement” of, another State.70 Although the better view is that the right
of self-defense applies to armed attacks by non-State actors,71 the ICJ has on
two occasions confirmed the restrictive position it took in Nicaragua.72
Should that approach prevail as a matter of law, those employing an
autonomous capability, or the autonomous capability itself, would need to
have the capacity to distinguish operations satisfying the conditions set forth
by the Court from those that do not.
Second, this uncertainty relates directly to the “unwilling-unable”
debate.73 Assuming for the sake of analysis that self-defense is available
against non-State actors, consider a case in which non-State actors are
70. Nicaragua, supra note 29, ¶ 195.
71. Compare Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 13, at 9 (stating the
right to self-defense applies to the actions of non-State actors), with FRANCE, MINISTÈRE
DES ARMÉES, supra note 12, at 8 (stating that self-defense is only available in response to
actions conducted “directly or indirectly” by a State).
72. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 139 (July 9); Armed Activities on the
Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, ¶¶
146–47 (Dec. 19).
73. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 19, at 347–48.
573

International Law Studies

2020

operating from the territory of another State without the involvement of that
State. May the victim State conduct cyber operations involving autonomous
capabilities into the territorial State against the non-State actor without
violating the territorial State’s sovereignty or the rule of non-intervention?
It may not do so on the basis of countermeasures because they are
unavailable in response to the operations of non-State actors, cyber or
otherwise, that are not attributable to a State. Should the non-State actor’s
operations not affect an essential interest of the victim State in a grave and
imminent manner neither would there be any basis to conduct the operation
pursuant to necessity. And if cyber operations involving autonomous
capability at the use of force level are needed to address the situation, neither
countermeasures nor necessity allow for the use of force.74 This leaves only
self-defense as a possible circumstance precluding the wrongfulness of the
cyber response to the non-State actor attacks.
There is substantial disagreement over whether self-defense may
preclude the wrongfulness of the violation of sovereignty that would occur
should the operation involving autonomy be launched on that basis into a
State to which the operation cannot be attributed. Some are of the view that
it cannot—that sovereignty is a veil pierceable only when the State
concerned is considered under international law to have directly or indirectly
launched the armed attack.75 However, numerous States hold a less
restrictive view, espousing the right of self-defense against a non-State actor
in the territory of another State when the territorial State is either “unable or
unwilling” to put an end to the hostile operations from its territory.76 In light
of this debate, States employing autonomous cyber capabilities into other
States against non-State actors under a theory of self-defense run the risk of
some States and scholars characterizing their operations as breaches of
sovereignty, unlawful, intervention, and, perhaps, unlawful uses of force.
Finally, any use of an autonomous cyber capability on the basis of selfdefense must comply with the requirements of necessity and proportionality
that have been recognized by the ICJ and are uniformly accepted across the
international community.77 In the context of self-defense, necessity denotes
74. The possibility is expressly ruled out in the Articles on State Responsibility. See
Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 2, art. 50(1)(a).
75. See, e.g., FRANCE, MINISTÈRE DES ARMÉES, supra note 12, at 8.
76. The United States, for instance, has long held this position in the non-cyber context.
See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the National Defense
University (May 23, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/
05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university.
77. Nicaragua, supra note 29, ¶¶ 176, 194; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶ 41 (July 8); Oil Platforms, supra note
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the requirement that there be no non-forcible means of dealing with the
situation effectively, while proportionality refers to the requirement that no
more force, cyber or non-cyber, be used than that which is required to end
the armed attack. Defensive responses at the use of force level that employ
autonomous capabilities, and the autonomous capabilities themselves, must
be capable of making such calculations if self-defense is to operate as a
circumstance precluding wrongfulness.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

It seems to be de rigueur in international law circles to approach new
technologies with grave concern. The rebuttable presumption seems to be
that international law will fall short in adequately governing them. That was
certainly the case with cyber operations. At the time the original Tallinn
Manual project was launched in 2009, claims that cyberspace was a
normative Wild West were frequent, and very much in vogue.78 Yet, by the
time of its publication in 2017, Tallinn Manual 2.0, drawing upon a diverse
group of international law experts from around the world, had identified 154
consensus rules and agreed upon nearly 600 pages of commentary.79
This does not mean that there are no remaining challenges in the
interpretation and application of the extant international law in the cyber
context. Nevertheless, States are making significant progress in assessing
how international law governs cyberspace, as illustrated by the work of the
multiple U.N. Groups of Governmental Experts, the proceedings of the
U.N. Open-Ended Working Group, and the number of statements on the
subject that have been issued in the last two years.80
To some extent, autonomy and international law suffer the same
dynamic. Initially, attention centered on lethal autonomous weapons
systems, with battle lines drawn between those who would outlaw the
systems and those who argued international humanitarian law suffices to
govern them, primarily through the interpretive process that occurs with all
44, ¶¶ 43, 73–74, 76; see also TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 19, r. 72, at 348, and
accompanying commentary, at 348–50.
78. Unfortunately, such claims continue to reappear. See, e.g., Michael Schmitt, NormSkepticism in Cyberspace? Counter-Factual and Counterproductive, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 28, 2020),
https://www.justsecurity.org/68892/norm-skepticism-in-cyberspace-counter-factual-andcounterproductive/.
79. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 19.
80. For a fuller discussion, see Michael N. Schmitt, Taming the Lawless Void: Tracking the
Evolution of International Law Rules for Cyberspace, 3 TEXAS NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW, at
32, 32 (Summer 2020).
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new technologies of war.81 Discussion of autonomy and international law
beyond the topic of warfare has only just begun.
It would appear, however, that as with many other nascent technologies,
at least with respect to the international law rules requiring respect for the
sovereignty of other States and prohibiting intervention into their internal or
external affairs, autonomy presents few challenges. Indeed, the normative
architecture appears quite sound. While there are numerous unsettled issues
surrounding application of these two primary rules to cyber operations, the
fact that a cyber operation employs autonomous capability has little legal
bearing on their resolution. Rather, autonomy simply makes it more difficult,
at least at times, to confidently apply the rules because of uncertainty as to
the consequences. Yet, these are dilemmas of fact, not law, and must be
understood and acknowledged as such.

81. Michael N. Schmitt, War, Technology, and International Humanitarian Law, 82
INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 137 (2006).
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